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Abstract
Evidence suggests that rank-based performance
feedback
(RBPF)
can
influence
workplace
performance. Still, knowledge about the differential
effects of RBPF on two central antecedents of
employees’ performance — perceived pressure and
individual goal-setting — is still sparse. We address
these gaps by using a survey-based study and found
that the effects of RBPF on individual goal-setting are
positive for high, intermediate, and low performing
individuals. However, these positive effects come with
a price: Low performers who find themselves at the
bottom of the ranking perceive their situation as more
pressuring compared to a situation without ranking.
Although these results point to a potential benefit, they
also cast doubt on the implementation of rankings
within the workplace.

1. Introduction
Companies are interested in increasing the
workplace performance of their employees. Receiving
feedback is commonly accepted as an important driver
of employees’ workplace performance [1, 2, 3, 4]. As a
result, different kinds of IS-enabled feedback regimes
have been implemented in a number of organizations.
Due to the recent trend towards implementing
gamification techniques such as leaderboards into the
workplace, rank-based performance feedback (RBPF)
regimes — which provide social standards against
which individual performance is gauged — have now
become especially popular [5, 6].
Recent evidence suggests that RBPF can positively
influence workplace performance [1, 7, 8, 9]. More
specifically, one channel having performance
enhancing effects is that RBPF can lead to an increase
in individuals’ goal-setting by (1) allowing to identify
with successful targets, and (2) reducing uncertainty
about the true status of one’s ability and possibly
attainable performance levels [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15].
However, research also suggests that the introduction
of RBPF into the workplace may have detrimental
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effects on workplace performance: Feedback regimes
can create an excessively competitive and pressuring
workplace due to employees’ constant strive for better
ranks (e.g., [16, 17]).
Still, one central aspect of RBPF has not yet been
the focus of intense research in workplace settings.
More specifically, the influence of individuals’ ranking
positions on perceived pressure has been largely
neglected, although there are good arguments for the
pressuring effect of RBPF potentially varying a great
deal across the performance distribution of a ranking:
Indeed, studies have shown that in upward
comparisons (i.e., comparisons to others that are betteroff), which are typical in the case of low performers,
individuals are made aware of their lack of skill, status,
or position, which increases their perceived stress [16].
In contrast, downward comparisons (i.e., comparisons
to others that are worse-off), which are typical in the
case of high performers, are capable of reducing stress
states [18, 19]. As a result, we expect that introducing
RBPF into the workplace (a) increases perceived
pressure for low and intermediate performing
individuals, and (b) decreases perceived pressure for
high performing individuals.
Similarly, no study that we know of has examined
how people respond to their ranking position in terms
of their individual goal-setting. As a result, we also
analyze RBPF’s influence on (c) individual goalsetting across the performance distribution of a
ranking.
In order to evaluate the influence of RBPF on
perceived pressure and individual goal-setting across
the performance distribution, we conducted a factorial
survey with 416 respondents and a repeated-measures
between-subjects design with three treatment groups:
low performers (Group 1), intermediate performers
(Group 2), and high performers (Group 3). The
baseline condition provided our subjects with a
criterion-based performance feedback (CBPF) that
allowed them to compare their performance to a
predefined performance level. Following this, subjects
had to answer a questionnaire on perceived pressure
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and had to set an individual goal for their future
performance. Respondents then received a vignette that
provided RBPF, which allowed for social comparison
by placing the low performers at the bottom rank,
intermediate performers at the middle rank, and high
performers at the top rank. Finally, subjects had to
once again answer the questionnaire and indicate a
performance goal.

RBPF may well vary for subjects at different positions
within a performance distribution. In other words, we
believe that the introduction of RBPF has a different
impact on the main antecedents of workplace
performance, depending on the individual’s rank. Thus,
in the following sections, we will build hypotheses
regarding the influence of RBPF on perceived pressure
and individual goal-setting according to an individual’s
position in the performance distribution.

2. Rank-based performance feedback
Providing feedback is essential to foster workplace
performance and guide employees’ efforts to meeting
an organization’s objectives. Feedback is defined as
“information about the gap between the actual level
and the reference level of a system parameter which is
used to alter the gap in some way” [20, p. 4].
In many cases, providing feedback entails
presenting information to employees about their
progress towards attaining predefined goals — thus
allowing them to compare their actual performance to a
given reference level [21]. In educational psychology,
this type of feedback is also referred to as criterionbased assessment or feedback (CBPF) in which an
individual’s absolute performance is evaluated against
a predefined scale [22, 23]. Usually, this type of
feedback regime relies on feedback being given
privately. As a result, comparisons to an absolute level
allow for competition, but only with one’s self [24].
Another frequently-used type of feedback is
relative performance feedback, which allows for the
interpersonal comparison of one’s progress, abilities,
or work outcomes to social reference levels [21]. More
specifically, an individual’s performance is assessed in
relation to other individuals based on their relative
performance [22, 23]. In particular, relative
performance feedback often relies on publiclyannounced performance rankings (e.g., inside a
company’s intranet). This so-called rank-based
performance feedback (RBPF) allows for social
comparison and, as a result, also allows employees to
compete with each other.
Studies have shown that RBPF can influence
workplace performance through some of its main
antecedents. More specifically, RBPF reveals people’s
social ranking, which can influence an individuals’
goal-setting. This, in turn, can drive workplace
performance [3, 12, 21, 25]. At the same time, RBPF
can also be demoralizing and create an excessively
competitive and pressurizing workplace, which can
negatively affect workplace performance [16]. In
summary, RBPF is commonly accepted as an
important (indirect) driver of workplace performance
through individual goal-setting and perceived pressure.
However, we believe that the effects generated by

3. Research model
3.1 Perceived pressure
Perceived pressure is commonly defined as the
perceived presence of situational incentives for
optimal, maximal, or superior performance [26]. It is
different from the active pressure-exerting behavior of
peers, colleagues or supervisors. Indeed, perceived
pressure is rather an inherent passive feeling that
people experience as a reaction to specific situations,
such as working in a competitive environment.
According to the theory of social comparison
processes [27], people have an inherent desire to
compare themselves to others in order to relate their
own features (abilities and opinions) to those of
relevant peers. Moreover, they deeply care about their
relative performance ranks. It is widely acknowledged
that social comparisons lead to competition, as
comparing to others either makes individuals aware of
their lack of skill, status or position, or of their success
[16]. Competition can be defined as situations in which
individuals’ outcomes are opposed and the gain of one
comes at the loss of the other [28]. This means that
individuals’ goal attainments are negatively correlated
with each other: A better performance and, hence, a
higher social status for one subject is always linked to
a lower performance and, hence, a lower social status
for other subjects [29]. As a result, competitions can be
perceived as pressuring, as users might feel they need
to constantly perform better than others.
Studies have shown that the urge to perform better
and better can have detrimental effects on
performance. This is commonly referred to as choking
under pressure [26] and describes performance
decrements in situations in which good or improved
performance is especially important. Moreover,
pressure can also be counterproductive when
cooperation is important - for instance, if it encourages
workers to behave unfairly and to sabotage each other
[30, 31, 32]. As a result, it is important for employers
to know the antecedents of perceived pressure so that
they can, if necessary, prevent it from emerging.
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RBPF allows individuals to compare themselves to
others since the information on social entities
(including oneself) is set in relation to others.
Introducing RBPF into the workplace can thus be
expected to influence employees’ perceived pressure
levels due to their constant striving for better ranks.
Research on perceived pressure as an outcome of
RBPF is sparse. [33] found no significant evidence that
rankings lead to increased feelings of situational
pressure while [17] found pressuring effects in
gamified working situations based on intensified social
comparison processes. However, both studies do not
investigate individual ranking positions. We believe
that the pressuring effect of RBPF may vary across the
performance distribution.
More specifically, RBPF offers opportunities for
both downward comparisons and upward comparisons,
depending on individuals’ position within the ranking.
Whereas upward comparison refers to individuals’
comparison to better-off individuals, downward
comparison describes individuals’ comparison to
worse-off individuals [34]. In the literature on social
comparison, studies have shown that downward
comparisons, which are typical for high performers,
can reduce stress states [18, 19]. In contrast, when
individuals make upward comparisons, which is typical
for low performers, they are made aware of their lack
of skill, status, or position, which increases their
perceived stress. In particular, if subjects perceive their
upward targets to be threatening [35], upward
comparisons are perceived to be ego-deflating and
stressful. In line with this, [29] and [16] showed that
low performers are put under intense pressure to
exhibit competitive behaviors.
Based on these theoretical insights regarding social
comparison processes, we hypothesize that the effects
of introducing RBPF into the workplace might well
differ for subjects in different positions within the
performance distribution. More specifically, we
postulate that the introduction of RBPF decreases the
perceived pressure of high performing individuals at
the top of the ranking and increases the perceived
pressure of low and intermediate performing
individuals at the bottom and in the middle of ranking,
respectively. Indeed, only high performers are in a
position that solely allows for downward comparisons.
In contrast, both the low and intermediate performers
are placed in a situation where they are made aware of
their shortfalls, and are, thus, put under intense
pressure. We hypothesize that:
Introducing rank-based performance feedback into the
workplace
(H1a) increases perceived pressure for low
performing individuals.

(H1b)
increases
perceived
pressure
for
intermediate performing individuals.
(H1c) decreases perceived pressure for high
performing individuals.

3.2 Individual goal-setting
Individuals draw inferences about their capabilities
via social comparisons, especially when they are
uncertain about their abilities [36]. Since RBPF
provides social comparison information, it is a useful
source to form individual goals and to consequently
adjust performance levels. In addition, research
indicates that individuals may not only respond to such
comparisons by attempting to adjust performance to
match their goals — indeed, they may also revise their
goals in light of their performance [37], providing a
further avenue through which individual goal-setting
can increase performance. As such, individual goals
are not static entities — rather, individuals frequently
revise their personal performance standards up and
down often as a reaction to being confronted with
feedback.
Empirical research has found individual goalsetting to have positive effects on self-regulatory
processes and outcomes such as effort, and persistence,
which in turn drive workplace performance (e.g., [37,
38, 39]. As a result, it is especially important for
employers to understand how individual goal-setting is
shaped by feedback interventions in order to support
workplace performance in the end.
On the whole, goals play an important role in
RBPF. Indeed, an inherent feature of the RBPF is that
it makes performance more salient, subsequently
allowing individuals to form individual performance
goals. This means of creating goals through RBPF
deviates from traditional workplace situations. Indeed,
whereas in traditional workplaces the individual goals
of the workers are created by the supervisors, in
ranking situations, the goals are created by the workers
themselves [40].
Uncertainty concerning the relative status of one’s
performance is an essential component that impedes
the upward goal revision and subsequent effort
enhancements. Since RBPF reduces individuals’
uncertainty about their status and leverages social
information about their capabilities, we believe that
RPBF can lead to upward goal revisions. We believe
this to be especially true in the case of downward
comparisons: In these cases, subjects experience the
success of outperforming others, thus increasing their
perceived individual goal-setting. As a result, they may
raise their self-set performance goals and thus
positively influence their performance [37]. However,
we suspect that this positive effect should hold true
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across the entire performance distribution, and not just
for high and intermediate performers. This means that
low performing individuals could also experience these
positive effects, as long as reaching a social standard
(that is, a higher rank) is perceived as attainable [38,
39]. The ranking could also provide important
information to the low-performing individuals: First,
observing others who are proficient at a task can reveal
useful information about how to improve oneself [41].
Second, individuals may come to identify themselves
with successful targets and perceive them as role
models, and leading to the imitation of the target’s
actions [42]. Third, seeing others succeed may propel
people to set higher personal standards, which can
motivate efforts towards these new and higher goals
[15]. We hypothesize that:
Introducing rank-based performance feedback into the
workplace increases individual goal-setting for
(H2a) low performing individuals.
(H2b) intermediate performing individuals.
(H2c) high performing individuals.

4. Research design
4.1 Factorial survey
To test our hypotheses, we conducted a factorial
survey (also called vignette study) [43]. Vignettes are
“short, carefully constructed description[s] of a person,
object, or situation, representing a systematic
combination
of
[the
investigation-relevant]
characteristics” [44, p. 128]. Respondents are then
confronted with these different fictional situation
descriptions and asked to assess them on the basis of a
questionnaire. The situation descriptions may consist
of a situational textual description, a video,
illustrations, or any other form of stimulation.
In our context, we asked our respondents to
imagine that they were a call center agent:
“Please imagine the following situation: Your
name is B. Smith and you are working as an agent in a
call center. Your job is to gather data for market
research in the food industry. You are working in an
open space office with 29 other call center agents. This
is what you see on your intranet:”
We then differentiated between three conditions by
giving a different performance level (high,
intermediate, low) to each group. More specifically,
the criterion-based performance feedback (CBPF)
provided to each group was either below the reference
level (low performers), at the reference level
(intermediate performers), or above the reference level
(high performers). Overall, we defined a performance

of 160/200/240 calls as being below the reference
level/at the reference level/above the reference level,
which corresponds to respectively 40/50/60 percent of
the 400 target calls. All respondents were randomly
assigned to one of the three performance groups.
Following the introductory text, the vignettes further
explained:
“The performance goal of 400 calls per agent has
not been met for several months. Hence, you and your
colleagues were asked to put more eﬀort into reaching
this goal. Your payment does not depend on your
individual performance1.”
The subsequent questionnaire included items that
measured participants’ perceived pressure. These items
were taken from a well-tested measurement
instrument: the Intrinsic Motivation Inventory’s
pressure/tension subscale [45]. The three items were
measured using a seven-point Likert-type scale ranging
from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”.
Furthermore, we asked the respondents to set a goal
with regards to the number of calls they trusted
themselves to reach that month:
“Based on the performance feedback you saw,
please fill in the number of calls you trust yourself to
reach in total by the end of the month. There is no right
or wrong answer. Fill in the number of calls which is
realistic for you.”.
This allowed us to infer individual goal-setting
which was operationalized as the difference between
the individuals’ self-set performance targets and the
externally predefined goal of 200 calls after half a
month2.
To make sure that the priming was successful,
subjects had to recall the vignette situation after
answering a few of the questions in the questionnaire.
For example, we asked them what their name and job
was in the vignette. If the subjects were unable to
answer these questions correctly, we repeated the
priming by presenting the vignette once again.
Furthermore, we gathered data on subjects’ social
comparison orientation and performance orientations
because research has shown that these covariates are
important determinants of people’s reactions to
We excluded any monetary aspect of tournaments and rankings in
order to (1) make a distinction to a related strand of research in the
field of economics that deals with the design of optimal labor
contracts and tournament incentive [52], and (2) to focus on the
consequences of social comparison processes and the pursuit of
social status in the absence of monetary incentives. This allowed us
to capture the non-pecuniary motivational and pressuring effects of
rank-based performance feedback.
2 This individual goal-setting measure is highly related to the
vignette situation since participants have to incorporate the ability of
the vignette character in order to provide a realistic goal. Hence, we
assumed that this particular operationalization would provide a more
accurate measure for individual goal-setting than questionnaire items
would provide in our vignette study.
1
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rankings [36, 46, 47]: People indeed differ in their
tendencies to engage in social comparisons, and social
comparison orientation is a trait that reflects these
individual differences [47] . Individuals who show a
high level of social comparison orientation have a
sensitivity to and awareness of others. Thus, for those
individuals, the effects of providing social comparison
information, such as through RBPF, are likely to be
intensified. Furthermore, individuals may have (a) a
desire for success because they perceive achievement
settings such as games and competitions to be
challenging (called performance orientation-approach);
or they may have (b) a desire to avoid failure because
they perceive competitions as being potentially
threatening (called performance orientation-avoidance)
[46]. Hence, the effects of RPBF can also be
influenced by the individuals’ performance
orientations. Table 1 presents our measurements.
Table 1. Measures, items’ loadings (t-values)
PP

AP

AV

SC

PP1

The performance target makes me feel .845
-.103
nervous.
(27.1)

.193

.052

PP2

I feel put under pressure by the .815
-.026
performance feedback.
(17.7)

.110

.039

PP3

I find working toward my goals to be .905
-.107
very stressful.
(44.2)

.272

.071

AP1

In games and competitions, I always
.915
-.118
strive to win.
(70.8)

-.350 .410

AP2

I always want to be the first in games
.941
-.080
-.352 .538
and competitions.
(162.6)

AV1

In games and competitions, I only try to
.252
avoid doing poorly.

-.128

.681
(8.7)

AV2

In games and competitions, I am
.194
satisfied with a place in the midfield.

-.415

.940
-.148
(35.6)

.525

-.117

SCO For me, success means to be better than
.054
1
others.

.098

.942
(128.7)

SCO I am very much looking at how well I
.901
.072 .415
-.022
2
perform in comparison to my colleagues.
(54.1)
Note: PP = Perceived pressure; AP = Performance orientation-approach;
AV = Performance orientation-avoidance; SCO = Social comparison
orientation.

After answering the questionnaire, we introduced a
RBPF into the vignette situation by means of a
leaderboard. Whereas our respondents up until then
only had information about their individual
performance, they now also had knowledge about their
peers, enabling them to compare themselves with
others through this relative performance feedback. The
continued vignette description read as follows:
“After half a month has passed, the average
number of calls did not change by much. For this
reason, your boss wants to give you better feedback to
reach the desired calls for the month. To reach the
performance goal more frequently, the performance
feedback feature in your intranet was updated. In
addition to individual performance feedback, there is

also a ranking list to give you and your colleagues
comparison feedback. The feedback refers to your
performance after 15 days of the current month, so you
still have 15 days to reach your goal of 400 calls. Your
payment still does not depend on your individual
performance and/or ranking position.”
Following this, the leaderboard was presented to
the respondents. Respondents that previously
performed below the reference level, met the reference
level, or performed above the reference level were
shown a ranking of 1/15/30 respectively (i.e., the
first/middle/last position on the leaderboard3).
In the final step, all participants had to yet again
answer the questionnaire described above, in addition
to a few demographic questions.
In summary, our vignette study consisted of three
groups that were first given criterion-based
performance feedback (CBPF) with no information
about their peers (t0). Their position in the
performance distribution was either below the
reference level, at the reference level, or above the
criterion-based reference level (Groups 1, 2, and 3).
Each respondent then had to answer items for our
perceived pressure measure and, in addition, had to
indicate a personal goal to measure their individual
goal-setting. Following this, the respondents again
received performance feedback, though this time, in t1,
it was relative performance feedback provided by a
ranking (RBPF). Finally, the respondents yet again
answered the questionnaire. Overall, this research
design enabled us to: (1) evaluate the influences of
performance transparency on each of our dependent
variables (within-subject) through the use of a ranking;
and (2) analyze whether these effects differed for
different positions in the performance distribution
(low, intermediate, high; between-subject).

4.2 Data collection
In January 2018, we recruited English-speaking
respondents via Amazon Mechanical Turk over a
period of two weeks. More specifically, speaking
English was an obligatory qualification for
participation in the study, and we promised a reward of
1 $ per questionnaire. In this manner, we obtained 732
online questionnaires. However, we had to drop several
datasets from our sample: First, we dropped 216
datasets where the respondents repeatedly answered
our
priming-control
questions
incorrectly.
The performance level itself did not change per respondent. For
example, respondents that performed below the reference level / had
met the reference level / performed above the reference level in the
criterion-based performance feedback (CBPF), also received a
bottom / middle / top rank in the rank-based performance feedback
(RBPF). Thus, the RBPF confirmed the CBPF, respectively.
3
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Furthermore, we dropped 39 datasets that were
answered very quickly by the respondents (less than 6
minutes, which was equal to the average time to
complete the questionnaire minus the standard
deviation). Finally, we dropped certain datasets due to
an obvious/invalid answer scheme (identified through
reversed questions and the open question on the
personal goal).
As a result, we had a final sample size of 416
respondents. Our sample consisted of 50.7% male
respondents with a mean age of 36.6 (SD = 12.28).
Nearly 60% of our respondents indicated that they
were currently employed. According to the results of
the Kruskal-Wallis tests, one-way Analyses of
Variance (ANOVA) and Pearson’s Chi-Square tests,
no significant difference was detected across
treatments in gender, age, current profession, social
comparison orientations, or performance orientations.
This suggests a successful random assignment of
subjects to our treatment groups and supports the claim
that the treatment groups did not differ with regards to
these important covariates. This means we could rule
out structural group differences as being the cause of
any differences found in our dependent variables
between groups.4

considered for removal from the scale if deleting this
indicator leads to an increase in composite reliability
above the suggested threshold value” [49, p. 145]
which was not the case in our analysis since all CRs
already met their suggested threshold as indicated
above. We thus kept all the indicators initially used.
Finally, the loadings from our indicators were highest
for each parent factor and the square roots of the AVE
of all constructs were larger than the absolute value of
the constructs’ correlation with each other, thus
indicating discriminant validity.

5. Results

5.2 Hypotheses testing

5.1 Measurement model

Our focus lies on identifying the effects of RBPF
for individuals in different positions of the
performance distribution. Table 3 presents the means
and standard deviations of our outcomes as a function
of the feedback regime (No RBPF vs. RBPF) and the
individual’s performance group (low, intermediate,
high).

To evaluate our measurement model, we performed
a confirmatory factor analysis in t0 for our Likert-type
scales via SmartPLS 3.2.4 [48]5. To test for
significance, we used the integrated bootstrap routine
with 5,000 samples [49].
Tables 2 and 1 present the correlation between
constructs together with the Average-VarianceExtracted (AVE) and Composite-Reliability (CR), and
our items’ factor loadings, respectively: AVE and CR
were at least .674 and .801, respectively, meeting the
suggested construct reliability thresholds of .50 and .70
[50]. All items but one (AV1: λ=.681, p<.001) loaded
high (at least .815) and significant (p<.001) on their
parent factor and, hence, met the suggested threshold
of indicator reliability of .70 [50]. Nevertheless, we
kept AV1 in our measurement model: “[I]ndicators
with loadings between 0.40 and 0.70 should only be

Table 2. Correlation between constructs, AVE,
CR
PP

AP

AV

SCO

Perceived Pressure (PP)

.733
(.891)

Performance OrientationApproach (AP)

-.105

.861
(.925)

Performance OrientationAvoidance (AV)

.248

-.378

.674
(.801)

Social Comparison
Orientation (SCO)

.067

.516

-.082

.850
(.919)

Note: Diagonal elements are the AVEs with the CRs in parentheses; offdiagonal elements are the inter-construct correlations.

Table 3. Descriptives
No Rank-Based
Rank-Based Performance
Performance Feedback, t =
Feedback, t = 1 (RBPF)
0 (NoRBPF)
Mean (St. Dev.)
Mean (St. Dev.)

Perceived
Pressure*

Range

Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Low
Intermed. High
Low
Intermed. High

1-7

4.87
(1.23)

4.54
(1.28)

Individual -200 - -53.46 -3.30
Goal-Setting +200 (34.01) (25.83)

4.51
(1.33)

5.30
(1.07)

4.51
(1.32)

46.07
-36.04 3.77
(37.68) (40.22) (31.20)

3.81
(1.42)
54.34
(43.60)

Note: *=composite score per construct, normalized with item count (=3)

The demographics of our final sample as well as the results of the
randomization check are available on request from the authors.
4

Another confirmatory factor analysis was performed in t1 and came
to the same conclusions regarding construct reliability, indicator
reliability, and discriminant validity as the one performed in t0. The
detailed results can be requested from the authors.
5

First, we took a look at the means of our dependent
variables and observed multiple things. (1) Concerning
perceived pressure, we observed differing effects of the
provision of RBPF in the different performance
groups: For the subjects at the bottom of the ranking
(low performers), perceived pressure increased
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(ΔLow = .43). In contrast, for the subjects at the top of
the ranking (high performers), the situation was
perceived as less pressurizing (ΔHigh = - .70). Similarly,
middle-ranked subjects (intermediate performers) also
reported a lower level of perceived pressure. However,
the measured decrease was quite small (ΔIntermed. = .03). (2) Concerning individual goal-setting, we saw
an increase across all treatment groups. All subjects
revised their goals upwards after being presented the
RBPF. However, the increase for bottom ranked
performers appeared to be the largest: While middle
and top ranked individuals increased their self-set goals
on average by 7.07 and 8.27 calls, respectively,
subjects in the bottom performance group increased
their goals by an average of 17.42 calls, which
corresponds to an increase of five percentage points.
After this initial examination of our outcomes, we
statistically tested for the significance of the observed
differences within our three treatment groups. Both the
assessment of QQ-Plots as well as the results of
Shapiro-Wilk tests proved that the data for our two
outcomes were non-normally distributed for both the
NoRBPF and the RBPF situation. Thus, we turned to
non-parametric two-sided paired Wilcoxon tests for
our analysis. The results are displayed in Table 4 (***
= p < .001, ** = p < .01, ns = non-significant).
Table 4. Intra-group analysis - results of
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Tests
Outcome

Group

MdnNoRBPF MdnRBPF Z

Group 1 Low
5.00
Perceived
Group 2 Intermed. 4.75
Pressure
Group 3 High
4.50
Group 1 Low

- 50.00

Individual
GoalGroup 2 Intermed. 0.00
Setting
Group 3 High
50.00

r6

p
***

5.50

- 5.755 .000

4.75

- .326 .744ns
***

.724
-

4.00

- 6.300 .000

- 30.00

- 4.812 .000*** .594

0.00

- 4.047 .000*** .472

60.00

- 2.963 .003

**

.899

6. Discussion

.393

We found that providing RBPF had significant
influences with large effect sizes on the perceived
pressure of bottom ranked individuals (ZPressureLow = 5.755, pPressureLow < .001, rPressureLow = .724) and top
ranked individuals (ZPressureHigh = -6.300, pPressureHigh <
.001, rPressureHigh = .899). More specifically, RBPF
significantly increased pressure for low performers and
significantly decreased it for high performers. In
contrast, providing RBPF had no significant effect on
the perceived pressure of intermediate performers
(ZPressureIntermed. = -.326, pPressureIntermed. = .744). We thus
rejected hypothesis H1b, and accepted hypotheses H1a
and H1c. These findings suggest that RBPF indeed
Effect sizes (r) of
small/medium/large [53].
6

.10/.30/.50

are

considered

to

affects only the perceived pressure of subjects at the
top or bottom of a ranking. More precisely, with
regards to perceived pressure, the introduction of
RBPF is only beneficial for individuals that rank high
(they perceive less pressure). For low performers who
rank at the bottom, the effect of using RBPF is actually
negative since they perceive higher pressure.
Furthermore, we found that providing RBPF had
significant influences with large and medium effect
sizes, respectively, on the individual goal-setting of
individuals in all three groups, i.e., bottom-ranked
individuals (ZGoal-SettingLow = -4.812, pGoal-SettingLow <
.001, rGoal-SettingLow = .594), middle-ranked individuals
(ZGoal-SettingIntermed. = -4.047, pGoal-SettingIntermed. < .001,
rGoal-SettingIntermed. = .472), and top-ranked individuals
(ZGoal-SettingHigh = -2.963, pGoal-SettingHigh < .01, rGoalSettingHigh = .393). More specifically, RBPF significantly
increased goal-setting for all individuals, that is, for all
low, intermediate, and high performers. We thus
accepted hypotheses H2a, H2b, and H2c. These
findings suggest that RBPF does increase the goalsetting of all subjects, independently of their position
in the ranking. In other words, with regards to goalsetting, the introduction of RBPF may be beneficial to
all users, regardless of their performance level and
individual rank.
In conclusion, providing RBPF has different effects
on subjects with different positions in the performance
distribution. More specifically, RBPF is not
unconditionally beneficial to all subjects within the
performance distribution. Indeed, besides the positive
effect on individual goalsetting, being compared to
others simultaneously leads to higher perceived
pressure for bottom-ranked individuals.

be

Feedback can either be given by comparing
subjects to a predefined external standard (criterionbased performance feedback, CBPF), or by relative
performance feedback that enables interpersonal
comparison, for example, in the form of rankings
(RBPF). Recent evidence shows that people are
interested in their (social) rank and that the human
preference for high ranks in general increases subjects’
performance, effort, and motivation [4, 5, 7, 8, 51].
However, rankings may create different feedback
situations at the individual level. This is why recent
research has turned to ranking effects and its
consequences on individual behaviors and affections.
Our paper contributes to the recent literature by
examining RBPF’s effects on perceived pressure and
individual goal-setting, which are important drivers of
workplace performance. First, we showed that an
individual’s performance level (high, intermediate,
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low) and their resulting ranking position (top, middle,
bottom) strongly determines how they react to the
provision of ranking feedback with regards to
perceived pressure. Second, we showed that RBPF
increases goal-setting for individuals of all ranking
positions. Most notably, the effect on individual goalsetting is largest for bottom-ranked individuals.
More specifically, our results suggest that the
effects of RBPF on perceived pressure strongly depend
on an individual’s position in the performance
distribution. Introducing RBPF appears to reinforce the
already existing variations of perceived pressure at
different positions in the performance distribution. We
already observed the highest scores of perceived
pressure for the low performers who fell below a given
reference level in CBPF. This insight is in line with
other research results proving that receiving negative
feedback (forced upward comparison) has negative
effects on affections, e.g. leading to frustration and
ego-deflation. By allowing low performers to compare
themselves to others, pressure is greatly increased:
Indeed, we found a steep increase in perceived pressure
among low performers. Being compared to others
makes them aware of their lack of skill, status, or
position relative to their colleagues. In contrast, we
found that high performers perceive the ranking
situation as less pressuring. The downward
comparisons reassure these individuals of their
superiority, which subsequently reduces the stress of
getting feedback and has soothing effects. Taken
together, we conclude that providing ranking
information has distinct effects on perceived pressure
for individuals with differing performance levels, and
that because of this, care should be taken when RBPF
is introduced in the workplace.
In parallel to this, our results hint to the fact that the
provision of RBPF can indeed be a useful tool to foster
workplace performance. We found that after a ranking
is introduced, low, intermediate, and high performers
revise their self-set performance goals upwards. These
overall positive ramifications across all three tested
performance groups may be driven by several effects.
First, introducing RBPF reduces performance
ambiguity for all groups, which has been shown to be
an important condition to developing realistic
individual goals. In other words, receiving timely and
accurate feedback that compares oneself to others
reduces uncertainty about the true status of one’s
performance. In addition to this, providing ranking
information also reduces the uncertainty of whether the
externally provided goal is attainable. This is
especially the case for low performers since the
feedback reveals that others are proficient at the task,
which can lead low performers to improve by
observing high performers. Second, for high

performers, the comparison with “worse-off” others
serves the goal of self-enhancement, leveraging
individuals’ self-esteem and belief that they can further
outperform others. The same holds true for middleranked subjects, since they get confirmation that they
are capable of fulfilling requirements. Third, with
regards to low performers, we found that the forced
upward social comparison is seen as indicating a large
potential for personal improvement. As such, RBPF
appears to serve the goal of self-improvement.

7. Limitations
Our study has some limitations. First, the situation
described in our vignette can never be fully realistic
and is especially prone to individual misperceptions. In
addition, our results might not hold true for nonEnglish speaking people, and differences might be
found for other age groups. As a result, the external
validity of our study might be limited. Although the
scenario and the wording were carefully constructed, it
is still possible that the respondents might have
misinterpreted the situations. Indeed, the situation that
was described in our fictitious scenario was not equally
realistic for all respondents. For example, in the case of
the students in our sample, it was maybe more difficult
for them to place themselves in a working situation
than it was for the employees in our sample.
Second, our intra-group results are prone to
sequence effects. Due to the fact that subjects had to
answer the same questionnaire twice, the results may
be distorted since subjects may not have been blind to
condition in the ranking situation. In other words, the
answers in t1 could have been influenced by the
baseline situation in t0. However, this limitation is
mitigated by the inter-group analysis, which proved
significant group differences in the reactions to the
provision of RBPF.
Third, it is possible that our participants lacked the
introspective ability to provide an accurate response to
the self-reported measures, especially since they had to
put themselves into a vignette situation. As a result,
behavioral measures gathered in a field study would
certainly be of value in order to confirm our results.
Fourth, our research design is limited by presenting
participants only with three possible ranking positions
(top, middle, bottom), leaving out all other potential
ranking positions as well as any potential effects driven
by time-variant dynamics of a ranking.

8. Conclusions
Our findings hold important managerial
implications with regards to the implementation of
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feedback systems in organizations. While the
introduction of rankings seems to be beneficial for
individual goal-setting, this positive effect comes with
a price: Low-performers who find themselves at the
bottom of the ranking perceive their situation as more
pressuring compared to a situation without a ranking.
These findings raise the question of the long-term
effects of such feedback interventions. Research has
already shown that higher pressure can lead to
detrimental performance effects [26], unethical
behavior [32], lower cooperation [31] and sabotage
[30]. In particular, if existing performance and ability
differences between employees are further stressed by
rankings, situations are created in which lowperformers lag far behind and reaching the social
standard seems impossible. In this case, rankings may
have adverse effects on performance.
Hence, from a managerial perspective, it is
important to mitigate the trade-off between leveraging
self-set goals and increasing pressure for low
performers. A possible solution might be to adjust the
feedback regime to the performance level of
employees. This may be especially beneficial for
distributed teams that mainly interact via IS, since
feedback interventions are then only minimally diluted
by social interactions. First, it could be useful to form
groups of employees of similar performance and ability
in order to avoid a situation in which some individuals
lag far behind others in the ranking. Second, adjusting
feedback regimes to the performance groups could be
another way of maximizing the positive effects of
feedback provision. Indeed, RBPF regimes may be
useful for enhancing the workplace performance of
high performers due to their self-enhancement effects,
but non-ranking feedback regimes such as comparison
to the mean performance of others may be more
suitable for low performers.
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